Perverted Justice: Why Courts are Ruling Against Restitution in Child Pornography Possession Cases, and How a Victim Compensation Fund Can Fix the Broken Restitution Framework by Morris, Tyler
Volume 57 Issue 2 Article 5 
2012 
Perverted Justice: Why Courts are Ruling Against Restitution in 
Child Pornography Possession Cases, and How a Victim 
Compensation Fund Can Fix the Broken Restitution Framework 
Tyler Morris 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tyler Morris, Perverted Justice: Why Courts are Ruling Against Restitution in Child Pornography 
Possession Cases, and How a Victim Compensation Fund Can Fix the Broken Restitution Framework, 57 
Vill. L. Rev. 391 (2012). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol57/iss2/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-2\VLR205.txt unknown Seq: 1 17-AUG-12 13:02
2012]
PERVERTED JUSTICE: WHY COURTS ARE RULING AGAINST
RESTITUTION IN CHILD PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSION
CASES, AND HOW A VICTIM COMPENSATION
FUND CAN FIX THE BROKEN
RESTITUTION FRAMEWORK
TYLER MORRIS*
“It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s
interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-be-
ing of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’ . . .  The legislative judgment, as
well as the judgment found in relevant literature, is that the use
of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to
the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child.
That judgment, we think, easily passes muster under the First
Amendment.”  It is also surely reasonable for the State to con-
clude that it will decrease the production of child pornography if
it penalizes those who possess and view the product, thereby de-
creasing demand.1
I found out last summer that if someone downloads a song
off the Internet the penalty is three times worse than if someone
[downloads] child pornography.  I couldn’t believe it.  How
could this be? . . .  I’m more upset about the pictures [of me] on
the Internet than I am about what [my abuser] did to me
physically.2
* I would like to thank the Villanova Law Review and its management for
choosing my article for publication and for support throughout the process.  I
would also like to thank: Anna, my compass, for advice, inspiration, confidence,
and love; my father for teaching me the great values of honesty, humility, and hard
work; my mother for teaching me the universal element—compassion; and my
brothers, because our brotherhood and competition made me strong and taught
me to fight.  Finally, a simple prayer for the victims of abuse everywhere—may they
find a lasting peace.
1. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1990) (quoting New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 747, 756-58 (1982) (alterations in original)).
2. Sexual Exploitation of Children over the Internet: What Parents, Kids and Congress
Need to Know About Child Predators: Hearing Before the H. Energy and Commerce Comm.
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 109th Cong. 444, 46 (2006) [hereinafter
Allen Hearings] (statement of Masha Allen), available at http://archives.energycom-
merce.house.gov/reparchives/108/Hearings/05032006hearing1852/Allen.pdf.
Ms. Allen’s statement is particularly remarkable in light of her circumstances: she
was adopted at age five from her birthplace in Russia by her abuser, who then
raped her violently for six years before putting images of the abuse on the In-
ternet. See generally James R. Marsh Testifies Before Congress, THE MARSH LAW FIRM,
P.L.L.C., http://www.marshlaw.us (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (discussing global
child pornography); Child-Porn Victim Brings Her Story to Washington, ABC NEWS
(391)
1
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I. INTRODUCTION: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY’S RISE
For evidence that the internet can be, at its worst, a medium for facili-
tating human beings’ most deplorable tendencies, one need only enter
the wrong combination of search terms while browsing.3  Most people
know, at least anecdotally through television shows like “To Catch a
Predator,” that the internet has been increasingly used to facilitate the
spread of child pornography and even predatory crimes against children.4
One prominent media observer has declared that, due to the internet, we
are in the “golden age of child pornography,” and one Senator has called
child pornography “a plague upon our people.”5  They are not alone in
their concern, as fears about child pornography have been so widespread
as to constitute “social panic.”6  While technology has made child pornog-
raphy less expensive to produce and disseminate, the financial estimates of
(Aug. 31, 2006), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/International/Story?id=1919036&
page=1 (discussing Ms. Allen’s Testimony).  Specifically, the fact that she is more
upset by the ongoing circulation of her pictures even after her abuser went to jail
than by the initial abuse demonstrates that possessors of such images inflict direct,
severe harm. See Allen Hearings, supra.
3. For a discussion of the nature of the crime of child pornography in the
context of the internet, see infra notes 24-44 and accompanying text.
4. See Internet Child Pornography: Hearing Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Sub-
comm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec., 107th Cong. 6-13 (2002) (statement of
Michael J. Heimbach, Unit Chief, Crimes Against Children Unit, Fed. Bureau of
Investigation), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/heimbach050102.
htm (describing need to protect children from sexual predation online); JANIS WO-
LAK ET AL., INTERNET SEX CRIMES AGAINST MINORS: THE RESPONSE OF LAW ENFORCE-
MENT vii (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.childcentre.info/projects/internet/
abusiveimage/dbaFile10840.pdf (“The Internet and computers have come to play
a growing role in sex crimes that are committed against children . . . .”) (footnote
omitted); Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, Child Porn
Among Fastest Growing Internet Businesses (Aug. 18, 2005), available at http://
www.ncmec.org/missingkids/servlet/NewsEventServlet?LanguageCountry=enUS&
PageId=2064 (describing vast growth of child pornography businesses online);
Child Porn Networks Growing Warns UN, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD. Sept. 17, 2009,
http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/child-porn-networks-grow-
ing-warns-un-20090917-fscv.html (same); UN Expert: Child Porn on Internet Increases,
MSNBC.COM, Sept. 16, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32880508/ns/tech-
nology_and_science-security/t/un-expert-child-porn-internet-increases/# (same).
“How to Catch a Predator” was a popular television show that lured sexual
predators who had attempted to meet children on the internet to a location where
they were interviewed and subsequently arrested on camera. See To Catch a
Predator, TOP DOCUMENTARY FILMS, http://topdocumentaryfilms.com/catch-
predator (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).
5. George F. Will, Nasty Work, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2000, at B7; 141 Cong.
Rec. 24,871 (1995) (quoting Senator Orrin Hatch in statement regarding Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1995).
6. Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
209, 217 (2001).  Professor Adler continues in the next section of the article to
document “The Discovery and Rise of Child Pornography.” See id. at 219-229.
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the size of the industry have grown to staggering levels, reaching into the
billions of dollars.7
As the problem of child pornography has increased, the tools used to
combat it have rapidly grown in scale and variety.8  Prosecutions have in-
creased.9  Blue-chip companies have partnered with the government and
devoted resources to developing innovative ways to eliminate images, or
freeze the capabilities of distributors.10  Congress has passed several strict
laws proscribing child pornography possession and instituting harsh
sentences.11  Further, the Supreme Court has carved out a rare exception
7. See, e.g., The Financial Coalition Against Child Pornography—Fact Sheet, NAT’L
CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, http://www.missingkids.com/missing
kids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=3703 (last visited
Sept. 10, 2011) (“Child pornography has become a multi-billion dollar commercial
enterprise and is among the fastest growing businesses on the Internet.  Through
the use of digital and web cameras, child pornography has become easier and less
expensive to produce.  Distribution on the Internet has facilitated instant access by
thousands and possibly millions of individuals throughout the world.  The ability
to use a variety of payment methods to purchase child pornography has made it
easier than ever to obtain.”)
8. See infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
9. See MARK MOTIVANS & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL
PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEX EXPLOITATION OFFENDERS, 2006, at 2 (2007), available
at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fpcseo06.pdf (explaining that child
pornography constituted 69% of sex exploitation offenses referred to United
States Attorneys in 2006 and accounted for 82% of growth in sex exploitation mat-
ters from 1994 to 2006).  However, concerns about prosecutorial overreach should
be quelled by the fact that prosecution rates are “infamously low.” See Robert Wil-
liam Jacques, Amy and Vicky’s Cause: Perils of the Federal Restitution Framework for Child
Pornography Victims, 45 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1175 (2011); see also YAMAN AKDENIZ, IN-
TERNET CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RE-
SPONSES 131 (2008) (“[Fifty-three] per cent [sic] of total referrals result in
prosecution, with an [eighty-seven] per cent [sic] conviction rate during the pe-
riod 1995-2003.”); MOTIVANS & KYCKELHAHN, supra, at 3 (“Thirty-nine percent of all
sex exploitation matters were declined for prosecution by U.S. attorneys in
2006.”).
10. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children,
Google Joins Industry-Wide Movement to Combat Child Pornography (Aug. 23,
2006), http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/NewsEventServlet?Lan-
guageCountry=en_US&PageId=2629 (describing Technology Coalition, which in-
cludes AOL, Yahoo!, Microsoft, EarthLink, Google, and United Online, and which
“will work to enhance knowledge sharing among industry participants, improve
law enforcement tools, and research perpetrators’ technologies in order to en-
hance industry efforts and build solutions”).
11. See generally Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-
208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-26 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-52
(2006)) (outlawing possession of pornographic materials featuring minors); Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 501(2)(D),
120 Stat. 587, 624 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251(2)(D) (2006)) (describing reper-
cussions and punishment for possessing and creating child pornography).
3
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to its First Amendment jurisprudence, which allows statutes to prohibit the
possession of child pornography.12
Yet despite such overwhelming emphasis on the harm caused by child
pornography and the need to combat it through all available means, fed-
eral courts are split on whether offenders found guilty of child pornogra-
phy possession should pay restitution.13  Those courts denying restitution
have generally based their holdings on a finding that the convicted child
pornography possessor did not proximately cause harm to a particular
victim.14
This Note argues that the proximate cause issue should be reframed
in terms of the concerns that underlie it—namely, fears of windfall profits
for victims and the logistical difficulty of dealing with a potentially large
volume of claims.15  Neither of those concerns is a sufficient reason for
denying restitution altogether.16  However, the manner in which some
courts have awarded restitution—through joint and several liability—is
equally ill-suited to the child pornography possession context, and may
reinforce the fears that cause some courts to deny restitution altogether
under the current proximate cause framework.17
This Note endeavors to find middle ground.18  Part II examines why
child pornography possession is harmful to victims, society, and even of-
12. See generally Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (creating child pornog-
raphy exception to First Amendment which would otherwise invalidate statutes
proscribing child pornography).
13. Compare United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 783 (E.D. Tex.
2009) (denying restitution altogether), rev’d sub nom. In re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d
190 (5th Cir. 2011), reh’g granted en banc, 668 F.3d 776 (5th Cir. 2012), with United
States v. Staples, No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2,
2009) (awarding $3,680,153 in restitution).  For a further discussion on the wide
range of outcomes in restitution requests, see infra notes 74-86 and accompanying
text.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Simon, No. 08-CR-0907, 2009 WL 2424673, at *7
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2009) (“[T]here is no evidence of harm to [the victim] caused
by defendant [who was only a possessor of pornographic images of the victim].”).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d 147, 154 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting
that victim had “no direct contact” with defendant, her “Victim Impact Statement
ma[de] no mention of [the defendant],” and expert’s evaluation of her was done
before defendant was arrested; these factors indicate that victim’s attorney was
searching for defendants without her realizing any particularized harm).
16. Cf. infra notes 24-44 and accompanying text (recounting tremendous and
recurring harm suffered by child pornography victims).
17. See id. at 156 (“[I]t would seem that the law does not contemplate appor-
tionment of liability among defendants in different cases, before different judges,
in different jurisdictions around the country.”); United States v. Van Brackle, No.
2:08-CR-042, 2009 WL 4928050, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2009) (“[T]he court must
estimate not only a total amount of harm, but must be able to ascertain with rea-
sonable certainty from the evidence presented what proportion of the total harm
was proximately caused by this defendant and this offense.”).
18. See infra notes 113-30 and accompanying text (outlining possibilities for
finding more suitable means for child pornography victims to recover damages).
4
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fenders.19  Part III provides a general overview of the history of child por-
nography possession legislation and jurisprudence with a particular focus
on restitution and the proximate cause requirement.20  Part IV recom-
mends a dramatic overhaul of the restitution framework for possession
cases.21
By accounting for the potential pitfalls of granting restitution while
maintaining a focus on the common sense reality of harm to victims result-
ing from the possession of child pornography, a workable solution
emerges: a victim compensation fund.22  Although it initially seems cum-
bersome, a victim compensation fund will increase enforceability and uni-
formity while promoting the broader goals of our legal system more
effectively than the current restitution framework.23
II. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSION: WHO IT HARMS
AND HOW IT HARMS
A. Harm to Victims
Public attention on the harm to individuals caused by possession of
child pornography has tended to focus on several prominent victims who
have filed numerous restitution requests.24  One of the most prominent
victims, “Amy,” who was depicted in the “Misty series” of child pornogra-
phy, has received significant attention due to her more than 250 requests
for restitution.25  Amy’s case is instructive as to the potential scope of
harm to one victim because in recent years the National Center for Miss-
19. See infra notes 24-44 and accompanying text (summarizing child pornog-
raphy, its impact on victims, and its harm to society).
20. See infra notes 45-86 and accompanying text (chronicling child pornogra-
phy laws’ historical development in the context of cases involving restitution and
possession).
21. See infra notes 87-130 and accompanying text (arguing benefits of rede-
signing restitution framework for awarding compensation in possession cases).
22. See infra notes 113-30 and accompanying text (proposing alternative to
current system of restitution through victim compensation fund).
23. See infra notes 121-30 and accompanying text (weighing potential burdens
of victim compensation fund with overall benefits to society and entire legal
system).
24. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Child Pornography, and an Issue of Restitution, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/us/03offender.html?
ref=US (describing prominent victims); James Walsh, Federal Judge Asks Prosecutors to
Put a Price on Child Porn, STAR TRIB. (Jan. 5, 2010), http://www.startribune.com/
local/stpaul/80672902.html?page=1&c=c=y (describing increase in restitution re-
quests from several victims).
25. See United States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that
victim sought restitution in over 250 cases); Warren Richey, A Bold Gambit to Reduce
Demand for Child Porn, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 16, 2009), http://www.cs
monitor.com/USA/JUSTICE/2009/0808/p22s01-usju.html (documenting vic-
tim’s attempts to seek restitution); see also United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d
597, 600 & n.3 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“A ‘series’ is a collection of child pornography
images depicting the same victim or victims; they are traded online among those
who deal in child pornography.”).
5
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ing and Exploited Children has identified over 35,570 images of Amy in
connection with more than 3,227 evidence reviews.26
Although significant emphasis on a select group of victims who have
aggressively pursued massive restitution claims from possessors helps raise
awareness about the staggering scope of harm caused by child pornogra-
phy, it may also obscure the more common scenario in which offenses or
victims remain unknown.27  It is often difficult to even identify the victim
depicted in a particular photo, and a myopic focus on prominent victims
results in a lack of emphasis on those who remain unidentified or who
choose not to step forward due to embarrassment or lack of financial
means.28
For example, due to the difficulty of identification, some courts have
declined to even recognize the child as the primary victim of the child
pornography offenses.29  That approach is perplexing given that the Su-
preme Court has emphasized that child pornography is harmful to its vic-
tims.30  The Court has stated that “the use of children as . . . subjects of
26. See Brief of Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children as Amici Curiae at
5, United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 6:08-CR-
0061) (describing extent of circulation of victim’s images), rev’d sub nom. In re Amy
Unknown, 636 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 2011), reh’g granted en banc, 668 F.3d 776 (5th Cir.
2012); id. at 9-13 (documenting extensive harm caused by incidents of child por-
nography); see also Susan Donaldson James, ‘Misty Series’ Haunts Girl Long After Rape,
ABC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/internet-porn-misty-se-
ries-traumatizes-child-victim-pedophiles/story?id=9773590 (“Nearly 35,000 graphic
images have now turned up in the collections of arrested pedophiles . . . .”).
27. See JANIS WOLAK ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN,
CHILD-PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSORS ARRESTED IN INTERNET-RELATED CRIMES: FINDINGS
FROM THE National Juvenile Online Victimization Study 1 (2005) available at http://
www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC144.pdf (noting that “it is likely
most CP possessors never come to the attention of law enforcement, because the
Internet allows them to commit their crimes privately and anonymously”).
28. See S. REP. NO. 108-2, at 5 (2003) (describing testimony of National Center
for Missing and Exploited Children stating that numerous prosecutors threaten to
drop cases unless victims are identified); Dan Koenig, Investigation of Cybercrime and
Technology-Related Crime, NAT’L EXECUTIVE INST. ASSOCIATES (NEIA) (Mar. 2002),
http:// www.neiassociates.org/cybercrime.htm (“The investigation of Computer
Crimes requires highly specialized skills.”); Chelsea McLean, Note, The Uncertain
Fate of Virtual Child Pornography Legislation, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 221, 237
(2007) (“The difficulty in identifying child victims is only further complicated . . .
by the anonymity of the internet.”).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 258 (3d Cir. 2007) (discount-
ing district court’s claim that possession of images depicting infant being raped by
adult and eight-year-old girl performing oral sex on adult male is “truly a psycho-
logical crime”); United States v. Toler, 901 F.2d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding
that child pornography is properly categorized as “victimless” crime because traf-
ficking in child pornography harms “moral fabric of society at large,” not individ-
ual depicted).
30. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 & n.9, 759 & n.10 (1982)
(citations omitted) (“It has been found that sexually exploited children are unable
to develop healthy affectionate relationships in later life. . . . [And] distribution of
[child pornography] violates ‘the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of per-
sonal matters.’”). For a discussion of how the view that child pornography solely
6
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pornographic materials is very harmful to both the children and the society
as a whole.”31  Thus, denying the existence of individualized harm to vic-
tims obscures the common sense reality that, although the harm caused by
each subsequent possessor is arguably less than that caused by the initial
abuser and producer of the pornography, each new instance of possession
violates and harms the victim anew.32  An inability to identify victims de-
picted in images does not change that reality.33
Various federal courts have laid out a framework for explaining the
specific harm endured by child pornography possession victims.34  For ex-
harms society contrasts with Supreme Court precedent, see Audrey Rogers, Child
Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 847, 855 (2008) (“Lower courts that
fail to recognize adequately the actual harm aspect [of child pornography laws as
articulated by the Supreme Court] foster the view that possession is a victimless
crime.”).
31. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758 n.9 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quot-
ing S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 5 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 42).
32. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002) (“Like a de-
famatory statement, each new publication of the [pornographic images of children]
. . . would cause new injury to the child’s reputation and emotional well-being.”)
(emphasis added); United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 930 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The
victimization of a child depicted in pornographic materials flows just as directly
from the crime of knowingly receiving child pornography as it does from the ar-
guably more culpable offenses of producing or distributing child pornography.”);
United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 613-14 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“[T]he real
issue is not whether Defendant has caused Amy harm—he has, because he circu-
lated the images—but whether his doing so is a substantial factor in her overall
harm. . . . [I]n this Court’s estimation, Amy has shown [as much] by a preponder-
ance of the evidence . . . .”); T. Christopher Donnelly, Protection of Children from Use
in Pornography: Toward Constitutional and Enforceable Legislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L. RE-
FORM 295, 301 (1979) (interviewing child psychiatrist who commented, “The vic-
tim’s knowledge of publication of the visual material increases the emotional and
psychic harm suffered by the child”); Rogers, supra note 30, at 853-54
(“[V]ictimization [of children depicted in pornography] lasts forever since the pic-
tures can resurface at any time, and this circulation has grown exponentially be-
cause of the Internet. . . .  At a more fundamental level, child pornography victims’
rights of privacy and human dignity are violated when their images are circulated
and viewed by others.”).
33. See United States v. Hibbler, 159 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1998) (denying
defendant’s argument that society at large was victimized because children could
not be identified, because “child pornographer, quite simply, directly victimizes
the children pictured in such materials [whether or not the victim’s name is
known]”); United States v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[Q]uite
unlike the drug and immigration offenses mentioned [by defendant]—which are
‘victimless’ crimes in the sense that the harm that they produce is spread evenly
throughout society—the harm caused by the distribution of child pornography is
concentrated [upon the child].”); S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 40 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 43 (“Of deep concern to the Committee is the effect of
child pornography . . . on the children who become involved. . . .  Such encounters
cannot help but have a deep psychological, humiliating impact on these young-
sters and jeopardize the possibility of healthy, affectionate relationships in the
future.”).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-CR-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *5
(E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009) (describing two types of harm: “‘Type I’ which stem[s]
from the direct abuse . . . and ‘Type II’ abuse which stems from the ‘knowledge of
7
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ample, the Fifth Circuit listed three distinct harms created by possession
offenses: it “perpetuates the abuse initiated by the producer of the materi-
als”; it is “an invasion of privacy of the child depicted”; and it “instigates
the original production of child pornography by providing an economic
motive for creating and distributing the materials.”35  Similarly, in re-
sponse to a defendant who argued that possessors are negligibly exacerbat-
ing an existing harm the original producer caused, the Third Circuit
stated:
Consumers . . . who ‘merely’ or ‘passively’ receive or possess child
pornography directly contribute to this continuing victimization.
Having paid others to ‘act out’ for [them], the victims are no less
damaged for [the consumers] having remained safely at home,
and [their] voyeurism has actively contributed to a tide of deprav-
ity that Congress, expressing the will of our nation, has con-
demned in the strongest terms.36
the dissemination and proliferation of the images of [the victim] at [the] times of
greatest humiliation and degradation.’ . . . . Type II trauma represents a chronic,
toxic condition, the knowledge of which continuously works like corrosive acid on
the psyche of the individual.”).
35. Norris, 159 F.3d at 929-30; see also Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-60; United States v.
Yuknavich, 419 F.3d 1302, 1310 (11th Cir. 2005) (“It goes without saying that pos-
session of child pornography is not a victimless crime.  A child somewhere was
used to produce the images downloaded by [the defendant], in large part, because
individuals like [the defendant] exist to download the images.”); United States v.
Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 786 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (agreeing with Fifth Circuit
that “the ‘victimization’ of the children involved does not end when the photogra-
pher’s camera is put away”), rev’d sub nom. In re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d 190 (5th
Cir. 2011), reh’g granted en banc, 668 F.3d 776 (5th Cir. 2012).  Although the
Paroline court ultimately denied the $3,367,854 restitution request made by the
victim, the court stated:
The end-user or possessor of pornographic materials may be considered
to be causing the children depicted in those materials to suffer as a result
of his actions in at least three ways: (1) because the dissemination of the
images perpetuates the abuse initiated by the producer of the materials, a
consumer who merely receives or possesses child pornography directly
contributes to the child’s continued victimization; (2) because the mere
existence of the child pornography invades the privacy of the child de-
picted, the recipient of the child pornography directly victimizes the
child by perpetuating the invasion of the child’s privacy; and (3) because
the consumer of child pornography instigates, enables, and supports the
production of child pornography, the consumer continuously and di-
rectly abuses and victimizes the child subject.
Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 786.
36. United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 259 (3d Cir. 2007); see also United
States v. Sherman, 268 F.3d 539, 547 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that “[t]he posses-
sion, receipt and shipping of child pornography directly victimizes the children
portrayed by violating their right to privacy, and in particular violating their indi-
vidual interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters”); Hibbler, 159 F.3d at
237 (“[T]he child pornographer, quite simply, directly victimizes the children pic-
tured in such materials.”); Boos, 127 F.3d at 1209-10 (rejecting defendant’s conten-
tion that children depicted in his pornographic images were “indirect” or
“secondary” victims of his crime).
8
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B. Offender and Offense Profiled; Restitution and Rehabilitation Conjoined
Appropriate punitive and rehabilitative measures must account for all
aspects of the phenomenon of child pornography, including the nature of
the offenders themselves.37  Although the average profile of child pornog-
raphy offenders may seemingly depict a lesser threat within a community
than that of the typical criminal, the extent of offenders’ deviance from
widespread social norms becomes apparent after a detailed examination
of the extremely graphic images they possess.38  While some controversial
court decisions have utilized overbroad definitions of child pornography,
and federal statutes define child pornography in fairly expansive terms,
the vast majority of arrests of child pornography possessors involve highly
explicit images showing very young children enduring graphic sexual
acts.39  Furthermore, statistics demonstrate that there is often a correla-
37. For a further discussion of the characteristics of child pornography of-
fenders, see infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
38. See MOTIVANS & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 9, at 2 (summarizing general pro-
file of child pornography offenders).  In 2006, 89% of those charged with child
pornography were white, 99% were male, and 58% had attended some college.
See, e.g., Goff, 501 F.3d at 251 (stating background information on defendant Stefan
Goff).  The court noted:
For more than thirty years, Stefan Goff was employed at a private elemen-
tary school in Mercer County, New Jersey.  Over time, he became a
trusted and influential member of the school community.  He was the
president of his college alumni association and volunteered his time for a
number of worthy charitable causes.  He was, to all appearances, a re-
spectable, middle-aged man leading a decent, law abiding life.  But in
Goff’s life there was a terrible divergence between appearance and real-
ity, because he was also a frequent customer of a child pornography in-
ternet site.
Id.; see also WOLAK ET AL., supra note 4, at 9 (explaining extremely graphic nature of
images most child pornographers possess).
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2006) (defining child pornography).  The statute
states
“[C]hild pornography” means any visual depiction, including any photo-
graph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or
picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other
means, of sexually explicit conduct, where—(A) the production of such
visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct; (B) such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or
computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (C) such visual depiction
has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable mi-
nor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
Id.; see also United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that child
pornography includes images of fully clothed children); WOLAK ET AL., supra note
4, at 9 (reporting that eighty-three percent of child pornography possessors had
images of children between ages of six and twelve, ninety-two percent of child
pornographers had images of minors focusing on genitals or showing explicit sex-
ual activity, eighty percent had pictures showing sexual penetration of child, and
twenty-one percent had images depicting violent and sadistic sex such as bondage,
rape, or torture).
9
Morris: Perverted Justice: Why Courts are Ruling Against Restitution in C
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-2\VLR205.txt unknown Seq: 10 17-AUG-12 13:02
400 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57: p. 391
tion between child pornography and sexual abuse, although the precise
nature of the connection has been the subject of debate.40
Offenders may come into contact with the criminal justice system too
late for courts to serve as the primary socializing institution; nonetheless,
“it is important that law and the legal system reinforce [social] norms and
not undermine them.”41  That is especially true of those who commit
crimes in the potentially dehumanizing realm of the internet, such as pos-
sessors of child pornography.42  The internet psychologically isolates them
from society by offering a place to indulge and reinforce fantasies and
behaviors that grossly contradict pervasive social norms.43  Against that
backdrop, ordering offenders to pay restitution might contribute to reha-
bilitating and re-integrating child pornography possessors into society by
causing them to acknowledge the impact of their actions on actual human
beings.44
40. See WOLAK ET AL., supra note 4, at 9-10 (explaining statistics and noting
that in one-year study, forty percent of those arrested for child pornography-re-
lated crimes both sexually abused children and possessed child pornography, and
an additional fifteen percent were dual offenders who attempted to abuse children
by soliciting undercover investigators who posed online as minors); see also Bene-
dict Carey & Julian Sher, Debate on Child Pornography’s Link to Molesting, N.Y. TIMES
(July 19, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/19/us/19sex.html?_r=2&oref=
slogin&oref=slogin (reporting statistics on male inmates and sexual abuse of chil-
dren).  A recent study of 155 male inmates serving sentences for possession or
distribution of child pornography at a Federal Correctional Institution in Butner,
N.C. found that eighty-five percent of individuals charged with possessing child
pornography admitted that they also sexually abused children. See id. (same).
41. Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 34
(2006).
42. See Patrick J. Keenan, The New Deterrence: Crime and Policy in the Age of
Globalization, 91 IOWA L. REV. 505, 548 (2006) (noting unique features of internet
communities).
43. See id. at 549 (“An Internet-based community, because it permits people to
isolate themselves into self-reinforcing groups defined by a single shared interest,
can create an atmosphere in which members perceive that there is greater lawless-
ness than actually exists.”).  Another fact that suggests isolation may be a factor in
child pornography is that most pornographers were unmarried at the time of their
offense. See WOLAK ET AL., supra note 27, at 1 (explaining that forty-one percent
were unmarried because they had never married and twenty-one percent were un-
married because they were separated, divorced, or widowed).
44. See Tonry, supra note 41, at 34 (“[T]heorists have long observed that the
criminal law’s main function is ‘general prevention’: reinforcement of basic social
norms that are learned in the home, the church, the school, and the neighbor-
hood.”).  Yet, the fact that the prevention aspect is in some sense generalized
should not detract from the importance of the encounter with the criminal justice
system for the individuals. See id. (noting “it is important that law and the legal
system reinforce [social] norms and not undermine them”).
10
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III. TREATMENT OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSION OFFENSES BY
COURTS AND CONGRESS
A. The Supreme Court Stated that Child Pornography Possession
Harms Individual Victims
In order to uphold statutes that proscribe child pornography posses-
sion, the Supreme Court carved out an exception to its prior holding that
the First Amendment generally protects private collections of lewd mate-
rial.45  The Court based the child pornography exception on states’ com-
pelling interest in protecting minors from abuse and exploitation.46  It has
also emphasized that “pornography’s continued existence causes the child
victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come,” and
even chastised one Respondent for attempting to “undermine the force of
the privacy interests involved.”47
Beyond the harm caused to each victim, the Supreme Court has also
noted the interconnected nature of the child pornography market and
has approved of efforts to attack it at all levels of the distribution chain.48
In its most recent case dealing with child pornography, the Supreme
Court further expanded the scope of the child pornography exception by
holding that “offers to provide or requests to obtain child pornography
are categorically excluded from the First Amendment.”49  Taken in the
aggregate, the Supreme Court’s child pornography possession jurispru-
dence prompted one observer to refer to child pornography law as the
“least contested area of First Amendment jurisprudence”—a statement
that attests to the clarity with which the Court has acknowledged the vic-
tims’ harm and the government’s interest in preventing it.50
45. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 107 (1989) (upholding prohibition on
possession of child pornography as constitutional); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 764-65 (1982) (holding that child pornography is not entitled to First Amend-
ment protection).
46. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109 (“It is evident beyond the need for elaboration
that a State’s interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of
a minor’ is ‘compelling.’” (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
47. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 n.10.
48. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 110-11 (“Given the importance of the State’s inter-
est in protecting the victims of child pornography, we cannot fault Ohio for at-
tempting to stamp out this vice at all levels in the distribution chain.”).  Although
the Supreme Court later declined to extend the child pornography possession ex-
ception to statutes proscribing possession of virtual child pornography (i.e., images
that do not depict real children), the Court’s decision hinged on the fact that no
real victim or harm was involved in such cases—a conclusion that reaffirms the
harm caused to real children when they are depicted in pornographic images. See
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002) (noting that in cases where
child pornography depicts real children, “each new publication” causes “new in-
jury to the child’s reputation and emotional well-being”).
49. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 299 (2008).
50. Adler, supra note 6, at 210; see also Rogers, supra note 30, 859-62 (recogniz-
ing harm to child victims and arguing that possession of child pornography is not
“a victimless crime”).
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B. Congress Combats a “Plague upon Our People” by Making Restitution
Mandatory; For Some Courts, Mandatory Approximates Conditional
1. Child Pornography Laws
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) was the first
attempt by Congress to address child pornography in the age of the in-
ternet.51  The Judiciary Committee’s report on the CPPA affirmed the
harm that child pornography causes to victims and emphasized that the
harm lasts for years after the initial abuse.52  Additionally, the report
found that child pornography can be used by possessors to desensitize
themselves to victims’ humanity and to convince children reluctant to en-
gage in sexual activity with an adult that other children are “having fun” by
doing so.53
In addition to solidifying its stance on the psychological harm child
pornography causes children, Congress joined the Supreme Court in not-
ing that pornographic images implicate the “privacy and reputational in-
terests” of the children they depict.54  Congress further recorded its stance
on the harm caused by child pornography by passing the Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, in which it stated that “[e]very
instance of viewing images of child pornography represents a renewed vio-
lation of the privacy of the victims and a repetition of their abuse.”55
2. The Restitution Revolution
At the same time that Congress considered legal approaches to child
pornography, significant changes were occurring in the realm of restitu-
tion for victims of other crimes.56  Traditionally, scholars argued that the
“principal value [of restitution] is not its ability to make victims whole, but
rather its utility as a corrective device [for offenders].”57  Modern restitu-
tion statutes increasingly cite a duality of rehabilitative and compensatory
51. See generally Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-
208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-26 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-52 (2006)) (ac-
knowledging that child pornography may be transmitted by computer).
52. S. REP. NO. 104-358 (1996) (affirming that child pornography harms vic-
tims and recognizing lasting effects of abuse).
53. Id.
54. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 § 121(1)(7).
55. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,
§ 501(2)(D), 120 Stat. 587, 624 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251(2)(D) (2006)).  The
Act also stated: “The illegal production, transportation, distribution, receipt, adver-
tising and possession of child pornography . . . is harmful to the physiological, emo-
tional, and mental health of the children depicted in child pornography and has a
substantial and detrimental effect on society as a whole.” Id. § 501(1)(A) (empha-
sis added).
56. See id. (noting developments related to restitution).
57. Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97
HARV. L. REV. 931, 937 (1984).
12
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purposes—a trend that gained momentum after the victims’ rights move-
ment of the 1970s.58
Thus, the restitution movement is indicative of the general trend of
modern crime legislation, which tends to be victim-focused.59  The
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) was designed to “en-
sure that criminals pay full restitution to their victims for all damages
caused as a result of the crime.”60  Concordant with the MVRA’s
mandatory label, Congress required judges to order payment of restitution
for victims of child pornography.61  Furthermore, the MVRA stated “[a]
court may not decline to issue an order [for restitution] under this section
because of—(i) the economic circumstances of the defendant; or (ii) the
fact that a victim has, or is entitled to, receive compensation for his or her
injuries from the proceeds of insurance or any other source.”62  Beyond
ensuring that victims received proper compensation, at least one court has
noted that Congress also sought to promote uniformity in restitution
outcomes.63
58. See, e.g., United States v. Rich, 603 F.3d 722, 729 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“[R]estitution payments have both compensatory and penal purposes.”); United
States v. Christopher, 273 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he purpose of restitu-
tion under the Mandatory Victim Reparation Act is to compensate victims for their
losses and to make them whole.”); United States v. Keith, 754 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th
Cir. 1985) (“Congress made restitution under the [Victim and Witness Protection]
Act a criminal penalty.”); see also S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 12 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 925–26 (“The principle of restitution is an integral part of virtu-
ally every formal system of criminal justice . . . .  It holds that, whatever else the
sanctioning power of society does to punish its wrongdoers, it should also ensure
that the wrongdoer is required to the degree possible to restore the victim to his or
her prior state of well-being.”); Matthew Dickman, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical As-
sessment of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1702
(2009) (providing history of restitution theory).
59. For a discussion of the focus of restitution, see infra notes 60-63 and ac-
companying text.
60. H.R. REP. NO. 104-16, at 4 (1995).
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(a) (2006) (“[T]he court shall order restitution for
any offense under this chapter.”); see also id. § 2259(4)(A) (“The issuance of a resti-
tution order under this section is mandatory.”); id. § 2259(b)(1) (“The order of
restitution under this section shall direct the defendant to pay the victim . . . the
full amount of the victim’s losses as determined by the court . . . .”); Beth Bates
Holliday, Annotation, Who Is a “Victim” Entitled to Restitution Under the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A), 26 A.L.R. FED. 2d 283, 283
(2008) (“Congress enacted the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) . . . to
reflect a fundamental shift in the purpose of restitution from a means of punish-
ment and rehabilitation to an attempt to provide those who suffer the conse-
quences of crime with some means of recouping their personal and financial
losses.”).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(4)(B).
63. See United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 609 (W.D. Pa. 2010)
(“Congress clearly intended the MVRA to create a uniform scheme for ordering
restitution in criminal cases . . . .”).
13
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3. Prisons or Payment?  Restitution as the Solution to the Sentencing
Guidelines’ Confidence Crisis
Congress has continually increased statutory minimum and maximum
prison terms and Sentencing Guideline ranges for child pornography of-
fenders, even as the Sentencing Commission has recommended lower
sentences.64  The impact of those congressional directives on actual sen-
tencing outcomes is apparent: mean sentences for non-production of-
fenses (i.e., possession, receipt, and distribution) grew from 26.79 months
in 1997 to 92.73 months in 2009—a nearly 350 percent increase in just
over a decade.65  In response to those increases, approximately seventy
percent of district court judges now believe the sentencing guideline
ranges for child pornography possession are excessive.66  Accordingly, dis-
trict court judges have liberally exercised their ability to depart downward
from the Guidelines.67  Moreover, some appellate courts have held that
probationary sentences pass their “reasonableness” scope of review even
when the Guidelines called for more than three years.68  Nevertheless,
64. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE HISTORY OF THE CHILD POR-
NOGRAPHY GUIDELINES (2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Re-
search_Projects/Sex_Offenses/20091030_History_Child_Pornography_Guide
lines.pdf (describing upward trend due to congressional directives); TROY STABE-
NOW, DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTH OF CAREFUL STUDY: A PRIMER ON THE FLAWED
PROGRESSION OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES (2009), available at http://
www.fd.org/pdf_lib/child%20porn%20july%20revision.pdf (same).  For example,
in response to the Sentencing Commission’s 1991 recommendation to lower the
ranges, Congress instead ordered the Commission to increase base level offenses
and add new enhancements. See Melissa Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Por-
nography Sentencing: Empirical Validity or Political Rhetoric?, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
545, 556 (2011) (describing interactions between Congress and Commission).  In
the PROTECT Act of 2003, Congress again issued several directives to the Commis-
sion to increase ranges and enhancements, and for the first and only time since
the creation of the Sentencing Guidelines Congress also unilaterally changed the
Guidelines. See THE HISTORY OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES, supra, at 65.
65. Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc/tsec.cfm (last visited Nov. 27, 2011) (utilizing calcu-
lator to determine mean sentences for 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252-2252A (2006)).
66. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGES JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 5 (2010), available at http://www.ussc.
gov/Research/Research_Projects/Surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey.pdf (describ-
ing results of Sentencing Commission survey).
67. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2009 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbl.28 (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/An-
nual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2009/SBTOC09.htm (stating that fifty-four per-
cent of non-production child pornography offenders received sentence below
Guideline range in 2009).  In about sixty-eight percent of those cases, the judge
cited a belief that the ranges were excessive as the reason for sentencing below the
Guidelines. See id.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Autery, 555 F.3d 864, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2009) (af-
firming probationary sentence despite Guidelines range of forty-one to fifty-one
months and defendant’s argument for forty-one month sentence); United States v.
Stall, 581 F.3d 276, 277-78 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming one day sentence despite
range of fifty-seven to seventy-one months for possession); United States v. Rowan,
530 F.3d 379, 380 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming probationary sentence despite forty-
14
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even in cases involving downward departures, sentences are often still sub-
stantial due to the severity of the ranges.69  And appellate courts have gen-
erally not been willing to find sentences that fall within the Guidelines
unreasonable.70
Against that backdrop, the U.S. Sentencing Commission has prom-
ised to issue a “review of the incidence of, and reasons for, departures and
variances from the guideline sentence” and to possibly recommend statu-
tory changes to Congress.71  The Commission should recognize the valid
points on both sides: judges advocating for lower prison sentences are cor-
rect to point out that societal panic should not impinge on sober analysis
of prison terms; yet, many advocates of higher sentences properly note
that downward-departing judges often wrongfully belittle or underesti-
mate the harm to victims.72  More importantly for purposes of this Note,
the Sentencing Commission should emphasize that restitution has the po-
tential to bridge the gap between the two sides of the sentencing argu-
ment, because it can both restore victims to their proper standing and
six to fifty-seven month range); United States v. Huckins, 529 F.3d 1312, 1314
(10th Cir. 2008) (affirming sentence of eighteen months with range of seventy-
eight to ninety-seven months); United States v. Smith, 275 F. App’x 184, 184 (4th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (affirming twenty-four month sentence with range of sev-
enty-eight to ninety-seven months for possession).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Weller, 330 F. App’x 506, 507 (6th Cir. 2009)
(affirming 120-month sentence where range was 324-405 months); United States v.
Beach, 275 F. App’x 529, 532 (6th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (affirming ninety-six
month sentence where range was 210-240 months); United States v. Grossman, 513
F.3d 592, 596 (6th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (affirming sixty-six months where range
was 135-168 months).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Guilliot, 383 F. App’x 416, 416-17 (5th Cir. 2010)
(affirming 151-month sentence for receipt with 121-151 month range); United
States v. Nikonova, 480 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming thirty-one month
sentence within range of twenty-seven to thirty-three months in possession case of
female defendant described as “exceptional” student who claimed to be primarily
motivated by academic interest); United States v. Rolfsema, 468 F.3d 75, 78 (2d
Cir. 2006) (affirming fifty-seven month sentence for possession with range of fifty-
seven to seventy-one months); United States v. Branson, 463 F.3d 1110, 1110-11
(10th Cir. 2006) (sentencing to fifty-one months for possession with range of fifty-
one to sixty-three months).
71. Notice of Proposed Priorities, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 76 Fed. Reg.
45008 (July 27, 2011).  That planned study follows an earlier report on the “History
of Child Pornography Guidelines,” in which the Commission noted the “particu-
larly active” control Congress has exercised over it in the area of child pornogra-
phy—a statement that perhaps obtusely foreshadows more active resistance. See
THE HISTORY OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES, supra note 64, at 1.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Paull, 551 F.3d 516, 533 (6th Cir. 2009) (Merritt,
J., dissenting) (“Our ‘social revulsion’ against these ‘misfits’ downloading these
images is perhaps somewhat more rational than the thousands of witchcraft trials
and burnings conducted in Europe and here from the Thirteenth to the Eight-
eenth Centuries, but it borders on the same thing.”).  For a further discussion of
how the nature of child pornography images demonstrate the drastic harm victims
suffer, see supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
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offer an alternative to incarceration if the Commission determines that
current guideline ranges are excessive.73
C. Barriers to Restitution:
The Proximate Cause Conundrum in Federal Courts
The statutory language of the MVRA has proven confusing for courts
deciding restitution requests in child pornography possession cases, and
the result has been inconsistent outcomes.74  Courts are split as to whether
proximate causation must exist between a possessor’s crime and a victim’s
73. See Schwartz, supra note 24 (describing controversy surrounding prison
sentences and interviewing individuals who suggest restitution as an alternative
that more effectively serves victims’ needs).  For a further discussion of the overlap
of rehabilitation and restitution, see supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Searle, 65 F. App’x 343, 346 (2d Cir. 2003) (stat-
ing that “18 U.S.C. § 2259 provides that a person convicted of sexual exploitation
must pay restitution”); United States v. Julian, 242 F.3d 1245, 1246-47 (10th Cir.
2001) (applying mandatory language of § 2259 to include mandatory restitution
for even future medical costs after crime of sexual exploitation); United States v.
Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 964-65 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that § 2259 “requires a sen-
tencing court to order a defendant convicted of a crime involving the sexual ex-
ploitation of children to pay restitution to the victim of that crime”); United States
v. Scheidt, No. 1:07-CR-00293, 2010 WL 144837, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2010)
(stating “it is clear that restitution is mandatory for any offense in [Chapter 110]”);
United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1249 n.101 (D. Utah 2004) (inter-
preting “shall order” language as signifying that restitution is mandatory for all
offenses under Chapter 110); see also  18 U.S.C. § 2259 (2006).  The relevant por-
tions of the statute read:
(a) In General.  Notwithstanding section 3663 or 3663A . . . the court
shall order restitution for any offense under this chapter.
(b) Scope and Nature of Order.-
(1) Directions.  The order of restitution under this section shall direct
the defendant to pay the victim . . . the full amount of the victim’s losses
as determined by the court pursuant to paragraph (2).
(2) Enforcement.  An order of restitution under this section shall be is-
sued and enforced in accordance with section 3664 in the same manner
as an order under section 3663A.
(3) Definition.  For purposes of this subsection, the term “full amount of
the victim’s losses” includes any costs incurred by the victim for-
(A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological
care;
(B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation;
(C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care
expenses;
(D) lost income;
(E) attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and
(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the
offense.
(4) Order mandatory.-(A) The issuance of a restitution order under this
section is mandatory.
(B) A court may not decline to issue an order under this section because
of-
(i) the economic circumstances of the defendant; or
(ii) the fact that a victim has, or is entitled to, receive compensation for
his or her injuries from the proceeds of insurance or any other source.
16
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quantifiable harm in order for courts to order restitution.75  Five circuit
courts require proximate cause, as do a large majority of district courts.76
Only the Fifth Circuit has declined to require proximate cause, joined by
at least one district court.77
Within that legal framework, restitution outcomes have varied
wildly.78  Some courts, in seeking to acknowledge harm but avoid
overcompensating victims or excessively penalizing defendants, have or-
(c) Definition.  For purposes of this section, the term “victim” means the
individual harmed as a result of a commission of a crime under this chap-
ter including, in the case of a victim who is under 18 years of age, incom-
petent, incapacitated, or deceased, the legal guardian of the victim or
representative of the victim’s estate, another family member, or any other
person appointed as suitable by the court, but in no event shall the defen-
dant be named as such representative or guardian.
18 U.S.C. § 2259 (2006).
75. Compare United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-CR-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *3
(E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009) (“A showing of causation is not specifically enumerated in
[§ 2259] as a prerequisite to an award of restitution.”), and United States v. Staples,
No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204, at *1-4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009) (completely
disregarding proximate cause in awarding restitution), with United States v. Van
Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042, 2009 WL 4928050, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2009) (“[Sec-
tion] 2259 requires the government to show . . . that the defendant’s offense proxi-
mately caused a specific loss on the claimants’ part.”), and United States v. Berk,
666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 188 (D. Me. 2009) (“[T]he plain language of the statute
clearly requires that losses—to be recoverable in restitution—must have been
proximately caused by the acts which constitute the offense of conviction.”).
76. See United States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2011); United
States v. McDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204, 1208 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Monzel,
641 F.3d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. Baxter, 394 F. App’x 377, 379
(9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125 (3d Cir. 1999).  The
Second and D.C. Circuits based the requirement on the “bedrock rule of both tort
and criminal law that a defendant is only liable for harms he proximately caused,”
as well as the fact that “nothing in the text or structure of § 2259 leads us to con-
clude that Congress intended to negate the ordinary requirement of proximate
cause.” Aumais, 656 F.3d at 153 (quoting United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528,
535 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).  The Ninth, Third, and Eleventh circuits, on the other
hand, have concluded that the proximate cause language contained in one sub-
section of the statute modifies the sub-section’s entire superior clause, rather than
simply the subsection that contains it. See Aumais, 656 F.3d at 152 (“These circuits
have read the last phrase of § 2259(b)(3)(F) . . . ‘suffered by the victim as a proxi-
mate result of the offense’ to apply to all the types of loss in § 2259(b)(3).”);
Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 610 (“18 U.S.C. § 2259 does require that a victim’s losses
be proximately caused by the criminal acts of the defendant for restitution to be
awarded.”); Van Brackle, 2009 WL 4928050, at *4 (“[Section] 2259 requires the
government to show . . . that the defendant’s offense proximately caused a specific
loss on the claimants’ part.”). But see Staples, 2009 WL 2827204, at *2-4 (declining
to examine proximate cause and holding that victim, “Amy” was harmed and war-
ranted restitution).
77. See In re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d 190, 198 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The structure
and language of § 2259(b)(3) impose a proximate causation requirement only on
miscellaneous ‘other losses’ for which a victim seeks restitution.”); Staples, 2009 WL
2827204, at *2-4 (emphasizing mandatory language of § 2259 and disregarding
proximate causation).
78. See Aumais, 656 F.3d at 152-53 (providing most recent overview offered by
circuit court of split over proximate cause requirement).
17
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dered token restitution amounts.79  Other courts have approved deals that
include restitution payments, such as when a former Pfizer executive pled
guilty to receipt and distribution of child pornography and agreed to pay
$130,000 in a formal settlement agreement.80  Prior to settlement, the
judge admitted that he was “dealing with a frontier” and estimated that
$200,000 would be an appropriate award due to the “feeling of revulsion
about this type of conduct.”81  In another instance, a judge avoided writ-
ing an opinion on the thorny legal issues when, “in the best interest of
justice, judicial expedience[,] and economy in resolving this novel legal
issue,” he approved an offender’s stipulation to the amount of restitu-
tion.82  A few courts have ordered multi-million dollar restitution pay-
ments.83  In July 2009, the Northern District of Florida, in one of the
largest restitution orders to date, entered an order against a non-produc-
tion defendant in the amount of $3,263,758, which included the victim’s
79. See United States v. Brunner, No. 5:08-CR-16, 2010 WL 148433, at *2
(W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2010) (awarding $6,000 and $1,500 to two victims because de-
fendant “participated in an ongoing cycle of abuse and thereby contributed to the
victims’ mental and emotional trauma”); United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-CR-150,
2009 WL 4110260, at *6 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009) (awarding $3,525); United States
v. Renga, No. 1:08-CR-0270, 2009 WL 2579103, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009)
(giving victim $3,000 in restitution because that was consistent with “the actual
harm [the] particular defendant caused” and therefore consistent with Congress’s
“finding on harm to children victims of child pornography”); United States v.
Zane, No. 1:08-CR-0369, 2009 WL 2567832, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009) (award-
ing two victims $3,000 each for restitution).  The Central District of California
adopted $5,000 as the standard amount of restitution it will award, whereas the
Eastern District of California has routinely chosen $3,000. See, e.g., United States v.
Brown, No. CR 08-01435, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113942, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5,
2009) (ordering defendant to pay $5,000 to victim); United States v. Ferenci, No.
1:08-cr-0414, 2009 WL 2579102, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009) (awarding $3,000
to victim).
80. See Schwartz, supra note 24 (stating Pfizer executive paid $130,000).
81. See Child Porn Damages Precedent Set, BBC NEWS (Feb. 24, 2009), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7907053.stm (explaining judge’s initial suggestion
of $200,000); see also Dina McLeod, Note, Section 2259 Restitution Claims and Child
Pornography Possession, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1327, 1328-29 (2011) (describing Hesketh
charges and settlement); John Christoffersen, CT Sets New Precedent for Child Porn
Cases, NBC CONNECTICUT (Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/
local/Man-With-Child-Porn-Must-Pay-Victim-.html (same); Warren Richey, A Bold
Gambit to Reduce Demand for Child Porn, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 8, 2009),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2009/0808/p22s01-usju.html (explain-
ing that Hesketh dropped appeal in exchange for reduced settlement of
$130,000).
82. United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 791 (E.D. Tex. 2009)
(quoting United States v. Granato, No. 2:08-CR-198 (D. Nev. filed Aug. 28, 2009)),
rev’d sub nom. In re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 2011), reh’g granted en
banc, 668 F.3d 776 (5th Cir. 2012).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Staples, No. 09-CR-14017, 2009 WL 2827204, at
*3-4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009) (ordering possession offender to pay $3,680,153
under joint and several liability without discussing proximate cause).
18
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lost wages and benefits assuming that she would have worked until age
sixty-five.84
Those courts that have awarded restitution have generally relied on
Congress’s explicit intent to make restitution to victims mandatory, as well
as the fact that offenders could reasonably anticipate real harm to actual
victims.85  On the other hand, the courts that have denied restitution alto-
gether have relied on findings of insufficient evidence to assess a specific
quantifiable loss caused by the offender, that the victim suffered absolutely
no harm at the hands of the defendant, or that the harms caused by child
pornography possession were “generalized” or attenuated in nature.86
84. See Jennifer Rothman, Note, Getting What They Are Owed: Restitution Fees for
Victims of Child Pornography, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 333, 350 (2011) (describing
restitution outcome of case in Northern District of Florida).
85. See, e.g., Brunner, 2010 WL 148433, at *3 (noting that courts generally re-
quire “causal connection” before awarding restitution, but that “no circuit to ad-
dress the issue has ‘imposed a requirement of causation approaching
mathematical precision’” (quoting United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1159-60
(9th Cir. 2007))).  The court in Brunner utilized a “slightly relaxed standard” of
causation, justifying its standard particularly on the basis of “the strong Congres-
sional intent behind section 2259.” Id. (quoting United States v. Danser, 270 F.3d
451, 455 n.5 (7th Cir. 2001)); see also United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1159-60
(9th Cir. 2007) (stating that court would “uphold an award of restitution under
Section 2259 if the district court is able to estimate, based on the facts in the re-
cord, the amount of victim’s loss with some reasonable certainty”); United States v.
Julian, 242 F.3d 1245, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 2001) (explaining that, based on plain
language of § 2259, district court has discretion in deciding how to calculate resti-
tution amounts for crimes of sexual exploitation); Jacques, supra note 9, at 1187
(“[C]ourts that have ordered payment of restitution for non-production child por-
nography offenses reason that Congress’s clear intent is to compensate victims in
such situations and that there is reasonably foreseeable harm from the activities of
these sex offenders.”).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Faxon, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1356-57 (S.D. Fla.
2010) (describing “difficulty attributing any of the acts committed by the Defen-
dant in this case to be a proximate cause of any of the trauma that was suffered or
continues to be suffered by either of [the victims requesting restitution]”);
Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 791 (“[T]he Government is conflating the proximate
cause requirement with the requirement that the victim be harmed as a result of
Paroline’s conduct.  Certainly, Amy was harmed by Paroline’s possession of Amy’s
two pornographic images, but this does little to show how much of her harm, or
what amount of her losses, was proximately caused by Paroline’s offense.”); United
States v. Van Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042, 2009 WL 4928050, at *4-5 (N.D. Ga. Dec.
17, 2009) (“[T]he court must estimate not only a total amount of harm, but must
be able to ascertain with reasonable certainty from the evidence presented what
proportion of the total harm was proximately caused by this defendant and this
offense. . . .”); United States v. Simon, No. 08-CR-0907, 2009 WL 2424673, at *7
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2009) (“[T]here is no evidence of harm to [the victim] caused
by defendant [who was only a possessor of pornographic images of the victim].”);
United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 191 (D. Me. 2009) (finding that victim’s
losses “are generalized and caused by the idea of their images being publicly
viewed rather than caused by [the] particular Defendant having viewed their
images”).  The court in Berk stated that there was “no evidence . . . the Victims
suffered any additional loss above and beyond what they had already experienced.”
Id. at 192.  However, the court also said “if there was evidence that the Victims had
19
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Eliminate Proximate Cause Entirely
The current process for restitution requests in child pornography pos-
session cases does not fulfill the overall goals of our criminal justice system
with respect to compensation and healing of the victim, rehabilitation of
the offender, or criminal justice in general.87  The proximate cause frame-
work is especially ill-suited for the context of child pornography because it
developed in grossly different factual and legal circumstances; indeed it
has been marginalized even in tort law due to its misleading and confusing
concepts.88  For example, the seminal proximate cause case taught to
most law students in the United States, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad
Co.,89 appears exceptionally antique in comparison to the technological
sophistication of the modern child pornography market, which relies on
an international, virtual web of users, all of whom should reasonably fore-
see that trading of nude pictures of real children harms those depicted.90
to attend even one additional counseling session due to [the defendant’s] actions,
then restitution may have been appropriate.” Id.
87. See S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 12, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 925–26
(“The principle of restitution . . . holds that, whatever else the sanctioning power
of society does to punish its wrongdoers, it should also ensure that the wrongdoer
is required to the degree possible to restore the victim to his or her prior state of
well-being.”); Tonry, supra note 41, at 34 (“[C]riminal law’s main function is ‘gen-
eral prevention’: reinforcement of basic social norms that are learned in the
home, the church, the school, and the neighborhood. . . . [I]t is important that law
and the legal system reinforce those norms and not undermine them.”) (citation
omitted).  Incarceration sentences for sex offenders have become increasingly con-
troversial in recent years. See generally Melissa Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child
Pornography Sentencing: Empirical Validity or Political Rhetoric?, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 545 (2011).
88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 29 cmt. b (“[T]he term ‘proximate cause’ is a poor one to describe limits
on the scope of liability.”).  The American Law Institute’s decision to reduce its
role in the Third Restatement exemplifies the general level of frustration with the
concept. See id.  Also, the Restatement discusses issues presented by proximate
cause in delivering jury instructions. See id. § 29 cmt. b, reporters’ note at 224-29;
see also Michael L. Wells, Proximate Cause and the American Law Institute: The False
Choice Between the “Direct-Consequences” Test and the “Risk Standard”, 37 U. RICH. L.
REV. 389, 391-92 (2003) (“Proximate cause, or ‘scope of liability,’ as the reporters
call it, is a sprawling and unruly topic.”).
89. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
90. See generally id. (establishing principles of proximate causation). Palsgraf
dealt with a bizarre chain of events that resulted in an unforeseeable harm: a rail-
road employee pushed a passenger, causing a package to explode, which in turn
triggered a scale to fall on the plaintiff who stood a considerable distance away. See
id. at 99-100 (describing facts of case).  Other emblematic proximate cause cases
cited by casebooks and law review articles seem to inevitably deal with improbable
or unforeseen circumstances like exploding rat poison, wooden planks that spark
fires in factories, or other such strange accidents. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 88, at
390-93 (describing several seminal proximate cause cases with strange factual cir-
cumstances that caused harm to plaintiffs that was totally unforeseeable or difficult
to foresee).  In comparison, child pornography victims are conspicuously foresee-
able to offenders. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002)
20
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Ironically, the statute requires a court to decide whether the person
requesting restitution qualifies as a “victim” before deciding the matter of
proximate causation.91  The result of that dichotomy is that courts seeking
to deny restitution requests must choose between two logically awkward
options: either deny that a child depicted in pornographic material is a
“victim” at all, or accept as a threshold matter that they were harmed
enough to be considered a “victim” but also find that the harm claimed
was not directly or proximately caused by the individual who possessed the
pictures.92
The judge in United States v. Paroline,93 who chose the latter option in
denying restitution, lamented the strange choice even as he decided it: he
expressed “sympathy” for the victim and explicitly acknowledged that eve-
ryone in the child pornography chain of distribution directly harms chil-
dren.94  Thus, the manner in which some courts read the current statutory
language creates a logically bizarre and difficult burden of proof for vic-
tims by requiring them to prove harm that ought to be self-evident based
on Supreme Court precedent, congressional intent, and our most funda-
mental societal values.95  An inability to identify victims should not bar any
(noting that difference between “virtual” child pornography and real child por-
nography is that latter foreseeably harms real children).
91. See United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 785 (E.D. Tex. 2009)
(“The Court’s first task is to determine whether Amy is a ‘victim’ of Paroline’s
offense.”), rev’d sub nom. In re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 2011), reh’g
granted en banc, 668 F.3d 776 (5th Cir. 2012).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 192-93 (D. Me. 2009)
(denying restitution but recognizing harm).  The Berk court denied restitution al-
together but stated that “if there was evidence that the Victims had to attend even
one additional counseling session due to [the defendant’s] actions, then restitu-
tion may have been appropriate.” Id. at 192.  Under this extremely literal and
stringent interpretation of the proximate cause requirement, it is difficult to imag-
ine how any victim could demonstrate which counseling sessions were due to
which possessor; that standard seems excessive, especially when viewed in light of
Supreme Court emphasis on the harm to victims and congressional emphasis on
the mandatory nature of restitution. See United States v. Danser, 270 F.3d 451, 455
(7th Cir. 2001) (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 2259 does not require highly specific
showing of injuries and costs incurred as result of defendant’s crime in order to
recover restitution).  The Danser court emphasized that it did “not believe that
Congress sought to create such a cumbersome procedure for victims to receive
restitution.” Id. But see United States v. Church, 701 F. Supp. 2d 814, 830 (W.D.
Va. 2010) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 234 (8th ed. 2004)) (utilizing proxi-
mate cause standard of “cause that directly produces an event and without which
the event would not have occurred”).
93. 672 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Tex. 2009), rev’d In re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d
190 (5th Cir. 2011), reh’g granted en banc, 668 F.3d 776 (5th Cir. 2012).
94. See id. at 792-93 (“The Court is sympathetic to Amy and the harm that she
has undoubtedly experienced and will continue to experience for the rest of her
life . . . .  However, the Court’s sympathy does not dispense with the requirement
that the Government [establish proximate causation].  Although this may seem
like an impossible burden for the Government, the Court is nevertheless bound by
the requirements of the statute.”).
95. See, e.g., Ashleigh B. Boe, Note, Putting a Price on Child Porn: Requiring De-
fendants Who Possess Child Pornography Images to Pay Restitution to Child Pornography
21
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form of payment by possession defendants because the court can nonethe-
less identify the number of victims depicted in the images and thus esti-
mate the amount of harm the offender has caused regardless of whether
each victim stands before the court.96
To deny restitution is to suggest that possession of child pornography
is a victimless crime, or at least a crime that harms children only indi-
rectly.97  In that way, denying restitution perpetuates the antisocial ten-
dencies of the offenders because it forgoes an opportunity to
counterbalance the encouragement they receive in online pornographic
communities with society’s determination that child pornography is harm-
ful to real victims.98  Conversely, awarding restitution would seem to rein-
force the rehabilitative process.99
Thus, the esoteric proximate cause framework should be reframed in
terms of the actual, legitimate concerns that underlie it—namely, fears of
windfall profits for victims and the logistical difficulty of dealing with a
potentially large volume of claims.100  Judges are justifiably intimidated by
the logistical difficulties that might result from a large volume of restitu-
tion requests in disparate locations around the country.101  Because judges
fear the prospect of offending victims and do not want to appear to trivial-
Victims, 86 N.D. L. REV. 205, 222-23 (2010) (“Courts are needlessly opining as to
the correct causation standard under the statute. . . .  [Based on explicit Supreme
Court precedent and congressional intent], when a defendant possesses porno-
graphic images of a child, the defendant is clearly causing the victim harm.”).
96. For a further discussion of the ability of courts to calculate restitution in
this manner, see infra note 97 and accompanying text.
97. For a further discussion of courts suggesting that child pornography pos-
session is a victimless crime, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
98. For a further discussion of the importance of reinforcing the humanity of
victims with respect to offenders who committed crimes on the internet, see supra
notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
99. For a further discussion of the overlap of rehabilitation and restitution,
see supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
101. See generally United States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2011)
(stating collection of restitution would need to be carefully monitored and would
“pose significant practical difficulties”).  The Second Circuit, which most recently
addressed the issue, expressed concerns about the lack of clarity as to “what gov-
ernment body, if any, is responsible for tracking payments that may involve defend-
ants in numerous jurisdictions across the country.” Id.  The Aumais court stated:
§ 2259(b)(2)—dealing with the enforcement of the restitution order—
cross references § 3664. Section 3664(h) implies that joint and several
liability may be imposed only when a single district judge is dealing with
multiple defendants in a single case (or indictment); so it would seem
that the law does not contemplate apportionment of liability among de-
fendants in different cases, before different judges, in different jurisdic-
tions around the country.
Id.; see also United States v. Van Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042, 2009 WL 4928050, at *4-
5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2009) (“[T]he court must estimate not only a total amount of
harm, but must be able to ascertain with reasonable certainty from the evidence
presented what proportion of the total harm was proximately caused by this defen-
dant and this offense.”).
22
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ize their suffering, they also hesitate to make explicit their discomfort with
the prospect of victims essentially fishing for defendants or potential
“windfall” or excessive awards.102  Although those are legitimate consider-
ations with respect to how to ensure that victims are properly compen-
sated, they are not sufficient reasons for denying restitution altogether;
victims should not be punished for the fact that the internet enables wide-
spread dissemination of their image and therefore creates logistical
difficulties.103
Restitution advocates often note the contradiction between awarding
substantial civil remedies for songwriters whose songs are illegally
downloaded, and yet denying restitution for children who were abused on
camera and whose images are then circulated against their will.104  Al-
102. See, e.g., Aumais, 656 F.3d at 154 (noting that victim had sought restitu-
tion in over 250 cases, victim had “no direct contact” with current defendant, Vic-
tim Impact Statement “ma[de] no mention of [defendant],” and expert’s
evaluation of her was done before defendant was arrested—factors giving impres-
sion that victim’s attorney was searching for defendants without her realizing any
particularized harm); United States v. Faxon, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1356-57 (S.D.
Fla. 2010) (“This Court bases this finding [of an absence of proximate causation]
upon the fact that . . . neither of these victims even knows the underlying facts of
this particular case.  Neither Vicky nor Amy know of this Defendant.  Neither know
of the criminal acts he perpetrated.”).  This concern is also highlighted by the fact
that in many cases denying restitution the judges express concern mostly with the
disproportionality of the victim’s attempt to recover several million dollars from a
single possession defendant under a theory of joint and several liability. See, e.g.,
United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 792 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (noting that it
is “clear that significant losses are attributed to the widespread dissemination and
availability of her images and the possession of those images by many individuals
such as Paroline,” but refusing to find defendant responsible for $3,367,854 in
restitution because he possessed two images), rev’d sub nom. In re Amy Unknown,
636 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 2011), reh’g granted en banc, 668 F.3d 776 (5th Cir. 2012).
103. For a further discussion of the harm child pornography causes victims,
see supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Brunner,
No. 5:08-CR-16, 2010 WL 148433, at *3 n.4 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2010) (“[Amy] is
expected to require residential therapy at a trauma recovery facility . . . .”).  The
Second Circuit’s acknowledgment of concerns about windfall profits and logistics
in Aumais, coupled with the fact that the Court refused to “categorically foreclose
payment of restitution to victims of child pornography from a defendant who pos-
sesses their pornographic images,” suggests that the Aumais court did not believe
that no harm was proximately caused, but rather the court was concerned with
proportionality and logistics. Aumais, 656 F.3d at 155.  The court’s restatement of
its holding supports that conclusion as well: “[W]here the Victim Impact State-
ment and the psychological evaluation were drafted before the defendant was even
arrested—or might as well have been—we hold as a matter of law that the victim’s
loss was not proximately caused by a defendant’s possession of the victim’s image.”
Id.
104. See 151 CONG. REC. S14187-03 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2005) (statement of
Sen. Kerry) (“Nothing will ever compensate [victims for the horrific experiences
they have] had, but the penalties provided in current law are embarrassingly low—
they are one-third of the penalty for downloading music illegally.”).  It is important
to note that Senator Kerry was discussing recovery under statutes providing for civil
remedies, discussion of which resulted in Masha’s law.  Adam Walsh Child Protec-
tion and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 707(b), 120 Stat. 587, 650 (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 2251(2)(D) (2006)).  Masha’s Law modified an earlier statute to
23
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though that analogy has its limitations because of the two distinct legal
contexts, it nonetheless demonstrates that, as a matter of policy, child por-
nography victims deserve the same level of protection that our legal system
confers on musicians, especially because child pornography defendants
potentially reap large profits in the process of their crime.105  The com-
parison also highlights the fact that, at the core of the debate over whether
to award restitution to victims of child pornography, society faces a funda-
mental question of policy.106  It would seem, however, that society has al-
ready answered that question in the clearest of terms through its
democratic institutions, its highest court, and general public opinion with
respect to child pornography.107  Consequently, the proximate causation
framework, which is confusing courts and denying the common-sense
harm that victims suffer, should be eliminated altogether in child pornog-
raphy possession cases.108
B. Ensure That Notice to Victims Is Optional
The current process for awarding victim restitution, which requires
that victims receive notice every time an image of them is found and then
petition courts if they want to seek restitution, may in fact exacerbate the
psychological harm to victims caused by the knowledge that individuals
possess images of their abuse.109  The question of whether receiving no-
increase minimum civil statutory damages from $50,000 to $150,000. See id.  It also
extended the time period in which victims may sue those who downloaded their
images. See id.  As a result, the statutory time period continues after the victim
turns eighteen. See id.  Thus, although Senator Kerry’s comments concerned civil
matters, the discussion of Masha’s law reinforces Congress’s broader recognition
that victims of child pornography possession are directly harmed to a degree that
warrants substantial financial recovery. See Rothman, supra note 84, at 347 (ex-
plaining that Masha’s law “shows that Congress recognized the damage incurred
by these victims and intended for victims to receive compensation [via criminal
restitution requests] without putting the burden on the victims to prove every as-
pect of their financial loss”).
105. For a discussion of the considerable profit made by those involved with
child pornography, see infra note 128 and accompanying text.  Some may argue
that civil remedies are a more appropriate avenue for victims to seek compensa-
tion than restitution requests. See, e.g., United States v. Strayer, No. 8:08-CR-482,
2010 WL 2560466, at *15 (D. Neb. June 24, 2010) (denying restitution, but sug-
gesting that victim could “pursue a civil action for damages under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2255”).  One recent article countered that stance by arguing there is no reason
to believe that “a claim for damages under this statute would not suffer the same
issues that arise under § 2259” due to similar statutory construction.  Jacques, supra
note 9, at 1190 n.119.
106. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1990) (emphasizing pol-
icy justifications in upholding child pornography laws).
107. For discussion of societal responses to child pornography, see supra
notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
108. For a further discussion of the excessive burden of proof faced by victims
in the current restitution framework and a proposed alternative solution, see infra
note 94 and accompanying text.
109. See United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-CR-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *5
(E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009) (describing chronic, toxic condition” caused by “knowl-
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tice is psychologically beneficial or harmful probably depends on the vic-
tim.110  Yet, although victims’ preferences and ideal therapy may vary by
case, and even if victims themselves might struggle to formulate their pref-
erences, the choice should belong to victims themselves.111  Notice of
each additional offender should be optional, and victims should be able to
recover restitution without attaching requests to the trials of the innumer-
able defendants who possess their images.112
C. A Victim Compensation Fund
1. The Proposal
Having highlighted the basic criticisms of the status quo, this Note
proposes that Congress should create a mechanism to ensure that victims
receive appropriate compensation for the harm that occurs when some-
one illegally possesses a pornographic image of them.113  Specifically,
Congress should create a national victim compensation fund, which would
ensure compensation for all victims and assuage due process concerns of
offenders.114  That solution has been proposed by at least two sources,
edge of the dissemination and proliferation of the images of [the victim] at her
times of greatest humiliation and degradation”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR
VICTIMS OF CRIME, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS ASSIS-
TANCE 20 (2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/ag_guidelines.pdf
(explaining victim notification process).
110. See United States v. Woods, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105 (N.D. Iowa 2010)
(“I learn about each [defendant] because of the Victim Notices.  I have a right to
know who has the pictures of me.  The Notice puts [a] name on the fear that I
already had and also adds to it.  When I learn about one defendant having
downloaded the pictures of me, it adds to my paranoia, it makes me feel again like
I was being abused by another man who had been leering at pictures of my naked
body being tortured, it gives me chills to think about it.”).
111. See Jacques, supra note 9, at 1194 (noting that opt-out notifications would
“mitigate the harm” because “victims would have the option to circumvent being
notified of the certain, continuous stream of offenders”).
112. See id. at 1193 (stating that “[notification] reaffirms the paranoia in-
volved with the lasting psychological harm of child pornography”).  Jacques specifi-
cally suggests a victim compensation fund as a solution to the “Problem of Notice,”
among other issues. See id.
113. For a discussion regarding the merits of a proposed national victims
compensation fund, see infra notes 117-30 and accompanying text.
114. For a further discussion regarding the merits of a proposed national vic-
tims compensation fund, see infra notes 117-30 and accompanying text.  Courts
have addressed concerns that awarding restitution without regard to proximate
cause would violate the Eighth Amendment, with differing results. Compare In re
Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d 190, 201 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating that “[the court does]
not share the [lower] court’s concern that rejecting a proximate causation require-
ment would place § 2259 in danger of offending the Eighth Amendment” because
“fears over excessive punishment are misplaced” as evidenced by “the statute’s
built-in causation requirement and the volume of causation evidence in the con-
text of child pornography”), and United States v. Renga, No. 1:08-CR-0270, 2009
WL 2579103, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009) (awarding $3,000 because court was
“confident [that amount] is somewhat less than the actual harm [the] particular
defendant caused” and therefore balances Congress’s “findings on the harm to
25
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including a judge who wrote an opinion denying restitution.115  Such a
program would not be without its logistical challenges, but it is necessary
to resolve the current dysfunction and inconsistency that plagues the jus-
tice system’s child pornography restitution decisions.116
2. The Current Victim Compensation Fund Landscape
By one estimate, existing compensation programs pay approximately
$500 million annually to more than 200,000 victims nationwide.117  These
programs are generally not funded with taxpayer dollars, but rather rely
heavily on offender fines.118  Moreover, child sexual abuse victims already
“comprise 29% of the victims helped by compensation programs.”119  Re-
garding the amount each individual can recover from compensation
funds, most states cap restitution at $25,000 per victim.120
3. Designing a Fund in the Child Pornography Possession Context
Various sections of standard sentencing guidelines provide a frame-
work that could be replicated to determine how much a particular defen-
dant should pay.121  The amount of funds that could be withdrawn by a
children victims of child pornography” against due process concerns), with United
States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 789 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (“This Court is of the
opinion that a restitution order under section 2259 that is not limited to losses
proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct would under most facts, including
these, violate the Eighth Amendment.”), rev’d sub nom. In re Amy Unknown, 636
F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 2011), reh’g granted en banc, 668 F.3d 776 (5th Cir. 2012), and
United States v. Van Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042, 2009 WL 4928050, at *5 (N.D. Ga.
Dec. 17, 2009) (stating that “[the victim’s] restitution request seeks to recover
from defendant all losses resulting from all acts by all abusers, without regard to
proximate causation,” and deciding that “[granting such an award here] would be
pure speculation and would risk violating the Eighth Amendment”).
115. See Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 793 n.12 (lamenting that court was bound
by unwieldy framework and seemingly “impossible burden for the Government,”
and noting that  “[p]erhaps a statutory provision requiring that fines for child por-
nography be paid to a national center that would act as a trustee to disburse funds
for counseling of victims of child pornography would do more to help these vic-
tims than the seemingly unworkable criminal restitution provisions in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2259”); Jacques, supra note 9, at 1189-98 (discussing merits of uniform and cen-
tralized fine system to compensate victims of child pornography).
116. For a further discussion of the merits of a victim compensation fund, see
infra notes 117-30 and accompanying text.
117. Crime Victim Compensation: An Overview, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM
COMPENSATION BOARDS, http://www.nacvcb.org/index.asp?bid=14 (last visited
Sept. 6, 2011).
118. See id. (“[A] large majority of states fund their programs entirely through
fees and fines charged against those convicted of crime. Federal grants to compen-
sation programs, providing about 35% of the money for payments to victims, also
come solely from offender fines and assessments.”).
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. See, e.g., United States v. Slater, 348 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2003) (apply-
ing sentencing guidelines to determine fine for defendant who sold counterfeit
goods).  A similar process could be used in determining a fine for a defendant
26
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particular victim should be capped, but at an amount sufficient to ensure
that victims receive adequate compensation for the dissemination and pos-
session of their image.122  Typically, insurance proceeds preclude recovery
from victim funds—an approach that should probably not be replicated
for a child pornography possession fund, given that Congress decided
against that approach in the MVRA.123  Moreover, recovery should not be
limited in any way based on amounts already recovered from pornography
producers, because those cases present completely different theoretical
and practical issues with respect to victim compensation.124
Although existing victim compensation funds are generally state-ad-
ministered, due to the nature of child pornography possession and the
inherently interstate nature of the internet, the child pornography posses-
sion victim fund should be federally administered.125  The interconnected
nature of the child pornography market and the violation of victims that
the market perpetuates warrant a comprehensive, national solution.126  A
national fund would account for a wide range of victims who are currently
disadvantaged by the restitution framework: those who the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children cannot identify, those who can-
not afford to bring numerous restitution claims, or those who simply do
convicted of possession of child pornography; see Jacques, supra note 9, at 1191
(“Congress should mandate a fine (e.g., $3,000) that could increase or be miti-
gated due to certain variables (e.g., the offender’s involvement in the proliferation
of child pornography and the amount of pornographic material possessed).”).
122. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, supra note 117
(stating that most states cap restitution at $25,000).
123. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2259(4)(B) (2006) (“A court may not decline
to issue an order under this section because of—(i) the economic circumstances of
the defendant; or (ii) the fact that a victim has, or is entitled to receive compensa-
tion for his injuries from the proceeds of insurance or any other source.”).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1160-62 (9th Cir. 2007)
(upholding order for producers of pornography to pay $16,475 restitution to eight
victims for future expenses); United States v. Searle, 65 F. App’x 343, 346 (2d Cir.
2003) (upholding $17,582.85 restitution order to victims’ guardians for counsel-
ing, transportation to counseling, and other costs incurred in taking custody of
victim after victim’s father was convicted of receiving and producing child pornog-
raphy); United States v. Danser, 270 F.3d 451, 455 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding
$304,200 in restitution to compensate victim for anticipated costs of future therapy
where victim’s father was convicted of improper sexual contact with his daughter);
United States v. Johnston, 707 F. Supp. 2d 616, 621 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (ordering
$1,662,930 in restitution for manufacturing child pornography); United States v.
Estep, 378 F. Supp. 3d 763, 770-74 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (ordering $221,480.10 to three
victims of sexual abuse and exploitation); United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp.
2d 1230, 1249 (D. Utah 2004) (ordering $79,698 for sexual exploitation of child
under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)).
125. See McLean, supra note 28, at 236 (describing National Center for Miss-
ing and Exploited Children’s role in identifying victims). Alternatively, or perhaps
additionally, a coalition of government and private actors could be formed to ad-
minister it, similar to The Financial Coalition Against Child Pornography.
126. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990) (“Given the importance of
the State’s interest in protecting the victims of child pornography, we cannot fault
Ohio for attempting to stamp out this vice at all levels in the distribution chain.”).
27
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not wish to repeatedly revisit the harm that possessors inflict on them by
receiving multiple notices.127  The fact that some possessors and dissemi-
nators of child pornography make large profits, given that some child por-
nography websites charge in excess of one thousand dollars per month for
membership, demonstrates the need to ensure that offenders are not en-
riched while victims experience costly trauma.128
Calculating restitution in a systematic manner, similar to sentencing
guidelines, will ensure that the offender considers the impact of his crime
on victims and will address concerns of proportionality.129  Therefore, a
national fund is preferable to the current system because it would ensure
that victims will not be denied restitution altogether, it would have the
benefits of a functional and uniform system, and it would eliminate con-
cerns about whether an offender might be forced to pay a disproportion-
ate amount of restitution.130
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, a compensation fund would lessen the burden on victims who
receive psychologically damaging notifications, ease fears about windfall
127. See, e.g., Jacques, supra note 9, at 1193 (“[N]otice of defendants could
sometimes be therapeutic for victims; however, forcing victims to learn the identi-
ties of their offenders to receive compensation might cause more harm than
good.”); Rothman, supra note 84, at 347 (noting that current statutory framework,
including MVRA, “indicates that Congress intended to make these remedies availa-
ble to all victims, especially those for whom attorney’s fees would have been
prohibitive”).
128. See, e.g., NAT’L CENTER FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, supra note 7
(“There has been a significant increase in the price of child pornography . . . .
[I]n 2006, it was common to see subscription prices of $29.95 per month.  Today,
the price points have increased dramatically.  It is not unusual to find sites that cost
up to $1,200 per month, and rare to find sites for much less than $100 per
month.”).
129. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1986) (“Restitution is an
effective rehabilitative penalty because it forces the defendant to confront, in con-
crete terms, the harm his actions have caused.  Such a penalty will affect the defen-
dant differently than a traditional fine, paid to the State as an abstract and
impersonal entity, and often calculated without regard to the harm the defendant
has caused.  Similarly, the direct relation between the harm and the punishment
gives restitution a more precise deterrent effect than a traditional fine.”).  Because
payments made to the national fund will reflect an assessment of the real harm a
defendant has caused, it will actually be more personalized than a traditional fine
paid to the state. See Jacques, supra note 9, at 1195 (“[B]y spreading payments
across all offenders, the average payment and burden on individual defendants
should become more proportional to the harm of their individual offense.”).
130. See Jacques, supra note 9, at 1189-90 (“The central difficulties that face
courts come from the established principle in criminal restitution that a restitution
amount should not exceed the actual loss that the defendant’s offense caused the
victim . . . . and the requirement that there be a preponderance of the evidence
with ‘“explicit findings of fact” supporting [a] calculation of “the full amount of
the victim’s losses.”’. . .  Due to the inherent difficulty of calculating damages for
non-production child pornography offenses, a nominal award could be the most
effective solution for the courts and Congress.”).
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profits, and ensure that offenders compensate victims in a manner propor-
tionate to the overall harm they have caused regardless of whether victims
are all readily identifiable.131  It would also require offenders to acknowl-
edge the humanity of victims and reinforce both social norms and the
goals of the criminal justice system.132  Logistical complexity is no excuse
for failing to provide victims with restitution; the current framework is bro-
ken and discordant with congressional intent to make restitution
mandatory by passing the MVRA.133  Although a victim compensation
fund may initially seem unwieldy, an extremely impressive array of actors
has already begun to collaborate for creative financial and technical solu-
tions to combat child pornography.134  Thus, existing, large-scale efforts
to combat child pornography demonstrate the feasibility of creative and
effective solutions; such resources could be similarly brought to bear to
implement a victim compensation fund.135
131. See supra notes 87-130 and accompanying text.
132. For a discussion of the way in which restitution causes offenders to con-
front the effects of their crime, see supra note 129 and accompanying text.
133. See United States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is not
entirely clear what government body, if any, is responsible for tracking payments
that may involve defendants in numerous jurisdictions across the country.  In addi-
tion, determining what amount Amy has received would entail collecting data
about hundreds of cases, ascertaining what money has actually been paid, and de-
termining what losses that money was intended to cover.”); United States v.
Danser, 270 F.3d 451, 455 (7th Cir. 2001) (utilizing loose requirement of causation
for restitution because under § 2259 “Congress chose unambiguously to use un-
qualified language in prescribing full restitution for victims.”).
134. See, e.g., NAT’L CENTER FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, supra note 7
(bringing together coalition of thirty-five prominent financial institutions and in-
ternet industry leaders, who have joined with National Center for Missing & Ex-
ploited Children and its sister organization, the International Centre for Missing &
Exploited Children (ICMEC), “to eradicate the commercial viability of child por-
nography by following the flow of funds and shutting down the payment accounts
that are being used by these illegal enterprises.”).  For those who argue that it
would be difficult to get Congress to act on a compensation fund, they need look
no further than the FCACP, because “Richard C. Shelby (R-AL), former Chairman
and current Ranking Member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, was the catalyst in bringing these industry leaders together to
address this problem.” Id.; see also GOOGLE JOINS INDUSTRY-WIDE MOVEMENT TO
COMBAT CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 10 (describing Technology Coalition,
which includes AOL, Yahoo!, Microsoft, EarthLink, Google, and United Online,
and which will “work to enhance knowledge sharing among industry participants,
improve law enforcement tools, and research perpetrators’ technologies in order
to enhance industry efforts and build solutions”).
135. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (describing creative financial
and technical solutions already taken to combat child pornography).
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